As the power business is moving into new territory with market deregulations, there is a need for expressing a view on financial and physical risks. By means of an example published earlier in this journal, we discuss what could be approprite measures of risk for a producer.
Introduction
In their article Managing Risk in the New Power Business, (IEEE Computer Applications in Power, April 2000), Pereira, McCoy and Merrill discuss risk management in the deregulated power markets. The article is valuable, both in its reflection on risk and its description of market issues. However, a central theme that resonates throughout the article involves the use of mini-max regret as a method for controlling risk in the decision making process. As we illustrate, the use of this measure is, itself, a "risky" prospect, largely because its conclusions can be so sensitive to the manner in which the problem is posed. In response to this observation, we suggest alternative approaches to risk management.
Background
We begin by revisiting the example provided by Pereira, McCoy, and Merrill.
Computer analysis of a transmission interface shows it to have from 0 to 900 MW transfer capability, with a uniform distribution. The transmission company (transco) has been asked to wheel power on a monthly basis, paying a penalty if it curtails service. The wheeling transaction has an uncertain load factor, modeled as 50% or 100% with equal probability. The point-to-point wheeling tariff is $1.80 per kW reserved per month. The penalty depends on the replacement cost to the buyer, and also is uncertain. Market simulation studies show that the average monthly penalty might be $5/MWh curtailed (Pr. = 0.9) or $20/MWh curtailed (Pr. = 0.1).
In the original example, the authors consider three distinct options for the contract wheel level: 300 MW, 500 MW, and 700 MW. To this we add a fourth option, 'do nothing', in which no contract is executed. With this data, we can calculate the net income expected per month for each combination of contract -load factor -penalty cost, from which the overall expected income can also be calculated. These values are tabulated in Table 1 Contracting for 500MW yields the highest return on average. However, Pereira et al discuss several drawbacks to using 'average' behavior for such decisions. For example, if it turned out that both the load factor and penalty cost are high, the losses associated with this contract are high. To avoid having such extreme values overshadowed (which can easily occur when looking at average values), they suggest that the contract that should be selected is the one that minimizes the maximum regret. 'Regret' is defined as "the difference in exposure between some choice and the best choice for a particular realization of the uncertainties." Decisions made with the objective of minimizing the maximum regret are usually intended to control the remorse that inevitably accompanies hindsight. In this example the load factor and penalty are uncertain. For each combination of these uncertain quantities and contract level, exposure is defined on the expected income/losses, and the table of regret values is given in Table 2 .
As in the original paper, we see that among the alternatives considered, contracting to wheel 300MW minimizes the maximum regret to which the transco will be exposed. This contract underperforms the contract for 500MW, on average. However, its worst-case regret in hindsight will be better. By contracting to wheel 300MW, the transco accepts a lower return on average and is able to avoid the high costs that result when the load factor and penalty costs are both high. When all is said and done, the transco will accept returns that are 18% lower on average. This type of conservatism is easily carried to extreme, and can yield decisions that are difficult to justify, as we illustrate in the following section. Suppose that in addition to the load factor and penalty costs, the transco is concerned about possible disruption in its transfer capacity. Suppose that an extremely unlikely event, which will reduce the upper limit on the transfer capacity from the current value of 900MW to 300MW is investigated. If this catastrophic event occurs, the transfer capacity will be uniformly distributed between 0 and 300, rather than 0 and 900. As before, we begin by investigating the average income associated with each of the different contract options. However, this time in addition to the load factor and penalty costs, whether or not the transfer capacity is impacted is a source of uncertainty. The expected net income under each of the possible scenarios is summarized in Table 3 below. The expected income associated with each of the four alternative contracts depends on whether or not the catastrophic event occurs. The likelihood of this event has not been provided, so we will simply denote it as "p". From Table 3 , we obtain the expected income in Figure 4 .
Note that overall, the average income from each of the four alternative contracts is essentially the same as those reported in Table 1 . This is especially true if p is small. However, the introduction of this new possibility has a substantial impact on the "regret" implications. The set of regret values corresponding to the incomes in Table 3 are in Table 5 .
From Table 5 we see that the maximum regret that the transco will face is minimized by the decision to "do nothing." That is, when the possibility of catastrophe is considered, the overwhelming likelihood that revenues will be generated is overshadowed by a remote, but gloomy, prospect that transfer capacity will be severely restricted at the same time that the load factor and penalty cost will be high. Hence, however small the probability of a catastrophe is, we prefer not to wheel anything at all. All it takes is for the event to be possible, or even just imaginable.
Discussion
As we have seen, the use of mini-max regret as a decision rule when facing uncertainty can lead to decisions that are difficult to justify. There are really two issues here: the use of a mini-max rule and the use of regret as a basis for calculations. Aside from the fact that maximizing expected profit is equivalent to minimizing expected regret, there is little (if any) support from economic theory for regret-based decision making. The notion of 'regret' attempts to offer a measure of a psychological response to information obtained in hindsight. When a company operates in a competitive environment, it is not an appropriate basis for measuring the value of the company. As a means of managing risk, we have seen that the mini-max rule behaves in an extreme fashion. That is, it is both pessimistic and sensitive to the choice of scenarios used when describing the problem. Much of this results from the fact that it ignores probabilities and treats all possible scenarios as "equal." As such, it may be a reasonable approach to consider when relevant probabilities are either unknown or subject to extreme disagreement among in-house experts. However, in the example provided, all relevant probabilities are assumed known ... it is hard to argue that one can make better decisions by disregarding relevant information! What does 'theory' offer in these cases? Pereira, McCoy, and Merrill offer mini-max regret as a means of countering the problems associated with the use of expected profit for riskaverse decision makers. There is a cost associated with risk-aversion. Risk-averse decision making is accompanied by reduced profits (on average). Economic theory offers many sound arguments suggesting that risk-aversion should be addressed by individual share-holders, not by companies. That is, a person who owns shares in two companies with negatively correlated incomes (for example, one that produces oil and one that uses energy), will experience less risk from varying oil prices than indicated by individual income streams -one company's losses will tend to be offset by the other company's gains. If the companies operate in a risk-averse manner, the share-holder will end up having paid twice for insuring a risk that is nonexistent from his perspective! The shareholder manages risk through proper portfolio selection, which requires a specification of his/her attitude toward risk, much the same way a company that choses to manage risk on its own must describe its risk attitude.
In the example, "risk" is implicitly recognized through the penalties for flow disruption. As a result, when minimizing maximal regret the contract choice is determined by the extremely unlikely possibility that high load factors, large penalties, and reduced transfer capacity occur simultaneously. A sound decision rule weighs risk against income. The mini-max rule is rather extreme, in that it considers one of these measures (risk), in much the same way that expected profit considers only income. It will accept the reduction of expected income by any amount for even a marginal improvement in the worst-case synopsis. This is especially problematic when the scenario that guides the solution is known to be very unlikely and subjectively chosen.
Rather than adopt a method that ensures that worse case scenarios dictate choice, perhaps a more prudent risk policy would be reasonable. For example, the transco could adopt a policy requiring that penalties from flow disruption not exceed a specified value on average, or they might restrict the frequency with flow disruption exceeds a specified value. That is, the transco might manage risk through operating policies and procedures, project selection, and diversification. The choices are many and the theories plentiful. However, the ultimate choice should in some way reflect a tradeoff between risk and income. Purely focussing on risk is particularly dangerous as the risk reduction may come at an unacceptable cost.
Illustrative Alternatives
There is no objectively correct way to define risk for an individual decision-maker. Economists often use utility theory to explain an individual's preferences among risky alternatives. In many cases, it is sufficient to investigate the manner in which expected profit varies with some relevant measures of risk, an approach that we will pursue in this section. As we do so, note that our primary interest is the manner in which our view of the trade-offs are influenced by the catastrophic even, particularly when this event is considered to be unlikely. Figure 1 depicts the manner in which the the expected profit depends on the contracted amount in the range of 0-900 MW. There are two curves, the original model which excludes the catastrophic event, and one in which the catastrophic event occurs with probability p = 0.01 (Note that excluding the event is equivalent to setting p = 0). Note that the two curves are nearly indistinguishable. This merely supports our observations on Table 4 -when p is small, the catastrophic event does not have a significant impact on expected profits. Of course, since this catastrophe is presumed to occur only rarely, it may be difficult to estimate p accurately. Figure 2 , again depicts the same two curves with p increased to 0.10, so that catastrophe is considerably more likely to occur. In this case, it is easy to distinguish between the two curves -the catastrophic event reduces the expected profit significantly. However, note the manner in which the curves continue to mimic each other. As the likelihood of the catastrophe increases, the profit maximizing contract size is only marginally reduced. In other words, as the probability of a catastrophe increases, we become slightly more defensive in our decision, but the decision does not change drastically as long as the event in question remains unlikely (indeed, one can argue that p = 0.10 is too high to be considered unlikely). Using mini-max regret to guide decision making, the amount to contract plummets to zero if the catastrophic event is considered "possible" -there is no graduated impact of the event's consideration. We have argued that in addition to expected profits, the transco's decision might be influenced by a measure of the "risk" that it faces when committing to a particular contract. The transfer capability and load factor may align in such a way that the transco is unable to deliver the contracted amount. Although this possibility is explicitly included via the penalty costs for shortages, a factor that might be of interest to the transco is the likelihood of being unable to deliver the contract. Figures 3 and 4 depict the probability of substantial shortages for contracted amounts in the range of 0-900 MW. Here, we consider a shortage to be "substantial" if it exceeds 50% of the contracted amount. Similar to Figure 1 , Figure 3 depicts these probabilities for two cases: one that excludes the catastrophic event, and one in which it is presumed to occur with probability 0.01. Similar to Figure 2 , Figure 4 depicts these probabilities when the likelihood of the catastrophic event is raised to 0.10. The probability of substantial shortages (i.e., less than 50% of contracted amount) for p = 0 and p = 0.01.
As before, we see (in Figure 3 ) that when p is small, the probability of a substantial shortage is nearly unaffected by the inclusion of the catastrophic event. As the event becomes more likely to occur, discrepancies in the shortage probabilities are apparent (in Figure 4) . However, the shortage probabilities differ in a smooth and moderate manner. Figures 1-4 indicate rather clearly that if the catastrophic event is considered to be unlikely to occur (the assumption here), neither the "reward" (i.e., expected profit) nor the "risk" (i.e., the probability of substantial shortage) is unduly influenced by its consideration. That is, an accurate estimate of p, the probability with which the catastrophe occurs is not critical to the decision to be made. Combining the information in Figures 1 and 3 , Figure 5 depicts the tradeoff between the expected profit and the probability of a substantial shortage. As throughout this section, Figure 5 includes two curves, one for which the catastrophic event occurs with p = 0.01. Each possible contract, C, is associated with a probability of substantial shortage, P {shortage > 0.5 * C}, as well as an expected profit. The horizontal axis is associated with the shortage probability, and the vertical axis is associated with the expected profit. Thus, the curve depicts the set of "risk" and "reward" combinations from which the transco must choose. There are several points of discussion associated with Figure 5 . First, when p = 0.01, the two curves are not visually distinguishable. This view of risk and reward is not influenced by an event that is considered to be only remotely possible. Second, it is obvious that some choices are better than others. For example, from Figure 5 we see that there are two choices that lead to an expected profit of $100K. One yields substantial shortages with probability 0.03, and the other yields substantial shortages with probability 0.23. Clearly, less risky choice would be preferred. With this observation, the set of preferred alternatives can be narrowed down, as indicated, and the rest can be eliminated from further consideration. Figure 5 depicts the set of possible alternatives from which the transco must choose.
At this point, the transco has some work to do. Among the set of risk/reward combinations depicted in Figure 5 , which one is preferable? To answer this, they must decide the maximum probability of significant shortages that they are willing to accept. If they are not willing to accept the possibility of significant shortages, the probability in question is "0". In that case, they should "do nothing" (i.e., not execute a contract), and the expected profit will be zero. Notice that unlike the mini-max regret guideline, this decision is not influenced by the presence or absence of the remotely possible catastrophic event within the model. As the transco's acceptance for failure to deliver increases (that is, as it accepts a higher level of risk), the expected profit increases as well. Of course, the maximum risk that the transco needs to consider is a 0.13 probability of significant shortage. If they accept a higher risk than that, they can safely focus solely on the expected profit.
In our discussion, we have modelled "risk" as the probability of significant shortages (i.e., shortages that exceed 50% of the contracted amount). We chose 50% based on the original model, which suggested that the inability to meet the contract was a primary concern. Admittedly, our choice was arbitrary. Any percentage could have been used, and different measures of risk are also possible. Nonetheless, neither risk nor reward measures should be unduly sensitive to events that are considered to be unrealistic.
Having raised the issue, we would like to offer some comments on the treatment of rare events with adverse impacts. The mini-max approach is extreme in the sense that it focuses on the rare event, at the expense of the remaining cases. In the previous section, we advocate an overall view, and search for a decision that provides a reasonable tradeoff between the normal cases and the rare event. But there is often a third possibility, which involves treating the rare event separately. This is particularly useful if the tradeoff between the normal cases and the rare case is such that to take care of the rare case, the losses in the other cases are substantial. For example, suppose that our concern is rainfall, and that we know (somehow) that there is a 0.01 probability of a year so dry that severe penalty costs will occur because we cannot deliver the contracted amount. The mini-max approach is to focus solely on a dry year, and plan the production accordingly, probably observing extreme spills 99% of the time. The approach that we suggest in the previous section involves planning with the whole picture in mind, so that the dry year produces a limited loss and the normal years are slightly less profitable than they would otherwise have been. How far we bring this tradeoff depends on our definition and acceptance of risk. Alternatively, it may be better to remove or reduce the risk by insuring against the rare event more directly. This insurance might be traditional insurance through an insurance company, or it might take the form of a financial instrument such as a weather derivative (that is, an option which is valuable only if a year is dry).
A discussion of risk modelling, from a general perspective, is an enormous task -one that is surely beyond the scope of this article. However, we hope that some basic principles are apparent from our discussion. Basing decisions on a mini-max rule can be a risky proposition! The resulting decision typically evolves toward a worst-case analysis, and is correspondingly sensitive to the particular cases that are considered. In some sense, we might interpret this as providing insurance against the worst case at an extremely high cost! Also, if the worst-case is inadvertently chosen arbitrarily, the conclusion of the analysis will appear to be arbitrary. Although arguments can be made for maximizing expected profit, if we wish to take risk explicitly into account, a tradeoff must be found between these two opposing forces.
